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CHRISTIANITY AND NATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Christianity, despite claims to the contrary, upholds the 
independent value of natural creatures, and is committed to an 
ethic of responsible care and stewardship of the natural world. 
These values were enshrined in the Old Testament, presupposed by 
Jesus Christ and assumed throughout the New Testament. They were 
sometimes forgotten or distorted, particularly in medieval and 
early modern times, but were never abandoned, and have 
continually been rediscovered. 
Controversies surround the teaching, inherited from the Old 
Testament, that humanity has dominion or mastery over the 
creatures, and attach also to the desacralisation of nature 
implicit in the adoption of belief in nature as a creature 
of God, and not as itself God. Yet dominion facilitates 
responsible stewardship and need not involve domination, 
recklessness or ruthlessness; and belief in creation implies 
that the world is God's world, full of God's glory, and need 
not involve objectionable varieties of metaphysical dualism 
such as otherworldliness or contempt of nature or nonhuman 
species. Central Christian teachings turn out to encourage 
ecological sensitivity, despite episodes (and whole periods) 
in history which seem to suggest the contrary. 
Controversies, however, surround not only what Christianity can 
or should say in the present, but also what was said or implied 
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in the Bible, the patristic (age of the church fathers) and 
medieval periods, and in subsequent periods. These periods, 
and their leading figures, will be considered in historical 
order in this chapter, which culminates in a brief 
discussion of modern debates. 
ATTITUDES OF JESUS AND THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS 
To understand Jesus' teaching about nature, we have to bear 
in mind the Old Testament beliefs about creation and also the 
Jewish ethical and legal tradition which he and his hearers 
shared. The assumptions of Jesus and the New Testament about 
creation and thus about nature have been characterised as 
including the following beliefs: that the one true God made 
everything in the universe; that the world was created for 
God's glory, and not for the exclusive benefit or convenience 
of any one species; that God orders everything with divine 
wisdom and providence; that the world is God's world and 
shares, as creation, in the good gifts of its creator, 
including the gift of freedom; and that God bestows a little of 
the divine creativity upon human beings, who are made in God's 
image, and calls them to cooperate with the Creator's purposes 
as the responsible holders of dominion over nature (1). These 
are largely unspoken beliefs, surfacing just occasionally, but 
implicit throughout the New Testament, including the teaching 
of Jesus (although sometimes recessive in subsequent Christian 
history). 
The related belief is also present that God has established a 
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covenant with humanity, and (in some versions) with the animals 
too (Genesis 9:8-11). Old Testament ethics and law express the 
human part in this covenant. Thus when Jesus appealed to 
recognised exceptions to the prohibition of work on the 
sabbath, exceptions concerning acts of compassion to relieve 
the suffering of domestic animals (Matthew 12:11-12, Luke 14:5 
and Luke 13:15-16), he assumed a responsibility for compassion 
towards domestic animals, and common practices embodying it. 
Such responsibility is commended in passages such as Proverbs 
12:10 ('A right-minded person cares for his beast') and 
implicitly in several more detailed passages of law in Exodus, 
Leviticus and Deuteronomy (2), passages which Jesus' near-
contemporary, Philo of Alexandria, expressly interpreted as 
motivated by compassion for animals (3). Far from focussing on 
animals, Jesus was arguing that relieving the suffering of 
human beings on the sabbath (such as his own healings) must all 
the more be lawful; but shared beliefs about considerate 
treatment of animals comprised the indispensable background of 
this argument. 
These passing references of Jesus to animals already show that, 
like the Old Testament, the New Testament cannot be interpreted 
as authorising a despotic attitude according to which humans 
may treat nature as we please. This despotic interpretation is 
ascribed to the Bible as a whole by Lynn White, and allowed as 
a possible interpretation of at least the New Testament by John 
Passmore (4); but neither the teaching of Jesus nor the Old 
Testament beliefs which it presupposes can be interpreted in 
this way without distortion. Despotic interpretations have time 
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and again been read into the Jewish and Christian scriptures, 
and have often suited those who find them there; but this does 
not make them any more deserving of credibility. 
When Jesus' teaching explicitly focussed on birds and plants, 
it again presupposed Old Testament teaching. Your heavenly 
father feeds the birds and clothes the lilies, he reminds his 
hearers, echoing the creation theology of the Psalms; are you 
not of greater value than they? (Matthew 6:29; Luke 12:24). 
Jesus' point here is God's provision for humans; but his 
conclusion depends, as Richard Bauckham shows, on shared 
beliefs in birds being fellow-creatures, and in God's 
providential care for the birds (5). It also presupposes God's 
bestowal on humanity of dominion over nature; but not an 
authorisation of despotic or tyrannical rule. 
Further sayings of Jesus stress God's concern for individual 
sparrows, despite their cheapness in the human valuation of 
his day (Matthew 6:26; 10;29-31; Luke 12:6-7; 12:24), and for 
individual sheep (Matthew 12:12). These passages, which also 
allude to Old Testament precedents, all argue that, because 
humans are of greater value, God is also concerned with each 
and every human. At the same time, they presuppose that 
individual animals too have intrinsic value in the eyes of 
God, albeit less than Jesus' individual human hearers; indeed 
the saying about lilies implies the presence of such value in 
plant life as well (Matthew 6:28-30). 
Thus the New Testament (like the Old) is irreconcilable both 
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with an anthropocentric ontology and with anthropocentric 
accounts of value, in which nothing but humans and their 
interests have independent value. Also the presupposition about 
the intrinsic value of individual animals conflicts with the 
view of some medieval Jewish and Christian writers that God's 
providence extends not to individual animals, but only to 
species (6). This later, species-related, view coheres with 
belief in the Great Chain of Being, often adopted by Christians 
influenced by Plato and Aristotle, but not with the New 
Testament. Yet it would be an artificial exercise to attempt to 
classify the Bible as biocentric, any more than anthropocentric 
or ecocentric, however much its value-theory may indicate such 
a label for its attitudes to creatures. For the Bible, all 
creatures derive their existence from God, and therewith the 
very possibility of having value in the actual world. If any 
centrism is found in the Bible, it is theocentrism, the belief 
that the world exists for God's glory. 
As Bauckham adds, none of Jesus' teachings accept that animals 
have been created only to serve humans, an idea subsequently 
adopted by Rabbi Simeon b. Eleazar, but absent from Genesis, 
and inconsistent with Job 39 (and Psalm 104 too). As such, it 
is unlikely to be an assumption of Jesus or the New Testament 
writers. Such notions sometimes entered later Jewish and 
Christian thought from Aristotelian and Stoic sources, where it 
was often held that all nonhuman creatures exist for the sake 
of their usefulness to humanity (7). Thus if the dominion over 
nature bestowed on humanity (according to Genesis 1 and Psalm 
8) implies some kind of superiority for humans over animals, 
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the context remains that humans and nonhuman animals are alike 
fellow-creatures, that animals are not to be regarded as merely 
of instrumental value, and that humans have responsibilities 
towards the animals that serve them. 
This also clearly excludes the view of Augustine that humans 
have no responsibilities towards animals. Augustine seems to 
have been influenced by the Stoic belief that humans are 
rational and animals irrational, and that therefore there can 
be no ties of justice in dealings with animals (8). But Jesus, 
who accepted human responsibilities towards domestic animals, 
would have rejected Augustine's view. Augustine was commenting 
on Jesus permitting the demons which he exorcised from the 
Gerasene demoniac to enter a herd of pigs, which then hurled 
themselves over a cliff. However, even if this narrative 
originated as an event (rather than as one of the parables 
which Jesus told), it does not show that he regarded pigs as 
valueless, unclean as they were held to be, but at most that he 
regarded a human as of greater value than the pigs (9). 
Jesus' relation to animals and to nature figures more 
significantly in the prologue to Mark's gospel, which relates 
that after his baptism Jesus spent forty days in the wilderness 
"with the wild beasts" (Mark 1:13). The language used (in the 
wilderness Jesus is also tempted by Satan and ministered to by 
angels, and a heavenly voice had just proclaimed him "my 
beloved Son") presents him as the Messiah, inaugurating the 
kingdom of God. In the prophecy of Isaiah, an age is proclaimed 
of peace between wild animals and humans, in a context which 
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makes it the age of the coming of the Messiah (Isaiah 11:1-
9). Against this background, Mark's phrase "he was with the 
wild animals" conveys that the messianic age is dawning, in 
which relations of fear between humanity and wild nature will 
be overcome. However, the animals are not subdued or tamed 
(as in some contemporary Jewish portrayals of the restoration 
of paradise); Jesus' companionable presence with the animals 
affirmed their otherness and their independent value. As at 
other moments of his life and teaching, he thus enacted an 
anticipation of the forthcoming kingdom of God (a kingdom not 
confined to humanity), and of the relations which are to 
characterise it (10). 
OTHER NEW TESTAMENT ATTITUDES 
Paul, despite his emphasis on sin and corruption, retained 
the Old Testament belief that the world is God's world, 
holding that God's creation is to be clearly discerned from 
the material universe (Romans 1:20). Here he was echoing a 
Jewish work of the recent past, the Wisdom of Solomon, which 
asserts that "the greatness and beauty of created things give 
us a corresponding idea of their creator" (Wisdom 13:1-5); 
Paul's claim was to prove an important bulwark both against 
other-worldliness and against critics of natural theology in 
centuries to come. Terrestrial bodies of different kinds 
(humans, beasts, fishes, birds), he taught, have their own 
glory, comparable with but different from the glory of 
celestial bodies (sun, moon and stars) (I Corinthians 15:39-
41). Indeed everything visible and invisible was created 
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by and for God's Son, and is to be reconciled through him to 
God (Colossians 1:15-20). 
Certainly, when discussing the Old Testament prohibition of 
muzzling the ox which treads the corn, Paul seems to forget 
these themes, and asks "Does God care for oxen?" (I Corinthians 
9:9f.), implying that the answer is "no", and claiming that 
this text is to be interpreted as concerning human labourers. 
But when concentrating on nonhuman nature he represents the 
whole creation as groaning in travail in expectation of release 
from corruption and of participation in the liberty of the 
children of God (Romans 8:19-22). For Paul, despite the effects 
of sin and of demonic influences, the entire created world 
forms part of God's redemptive plan and is destined to regain 
its proper glory (11). 
The Johannine writings seek to counter tendencies (from within 
the Jewish and early Christian communities) to represent the 
world as a battle-ground between equal forces of good and evil, 
in which salvation requires rejection of the world of flesh 
(Gnosticism). John's prologue maintains that the bringer of 
salvation is also the Logos, God's agent in creation, who has 
also become flesh and dwelt amongst us (John 1:1-14). Among 
other themes present here, the value of the created world is 
reaffirmed (12). In another of the Johannine writings, the book 
of Revelation, John's vision symbolically concerns the 
restoration of Eden and the tree of life, the leaves of which 
"were for the healing of nations" (Revelation 22:2). 
PAGE 9 
Thus the cosmic visions of Paul and John cannot be regarded 
as instrumentalist or anthropocentric. Like Mark, and like 
the author of Hebrews (Hebrews 1:2f) these writers appealed 
to Old Testament beliefs concerning creation, and 
represented salvation as not confined to humanity, but as a 
cosmic fulfilment of the creator's plan. 
While the biblical writers do not use the metaphor of 
stewardship with regard to the role of humanity in relation to 
the natural world, and while their view of the roles of both 
humanity and nature extends far beyond stewardship, the model 
of humanity as God's steward is, arguably, as Glacken writes 
(13), an appropriate one. It fits the injunctions to till and 
to keep the garden (Genesis 2:15); the making of man and woman 
in the image of God (Genesis 1:27); Jesus' presuppositions 
about the value of nonhuman creatures (see above); the Old 
Testament teaching that the land belongs not to humans but to 
God (Leviticus 25:23), and is only held conditionally 
(Leviticus 25:2-13); Jesus' parables about stewardship and 
accountability for the use of resources (Matthew 21:33-41; 
24:45-51; 25:14-30; Mark 12:1-9; Luke 12:36-38; 19:12-27; 
20:9-16); and the teachings about responsibilities for 
compassion and consideration to nonhumans which (as has been 
seen) pervade the Old and New Testaments. While no 
anthropocentric interpretation is credible, and while 
stewardship has sometimes been charged with an anthropocentric 
tendency which treats nature as mere resources (14), an ethic 
of responsibility before God to work, cherish and preserve the 
natural environment and respect the independent value (and the 
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glory) of fellow-creatures, can fairly be recognised as immune 
from this charge, without ceasing to be one of stewardship 
(15). 
PATRISTIC AND MEDIEVAL ATTITUDES 
The fathers of the early church added an awareness of pagan 
attitudes to nature; while some sought to blend Greek 
philosophy with Christianity, others took on Gnosticism. Thus 
Irenaeus, the second-century Bishop of Lyons, rejected the 
Gnostic belief that nature is evil, and maintained that nature 
is cared for by God as a home for humanity, and is to share in 
the fulfilment of the creator's plan (16). The role of humanity 
in completing creation became a recurrent theme among patristic 
writers including Origen, Basil and Ambrose, and modern writers 
such as John Ray, William Derham and many others. 
The Stoic view that irrational creatures have been made for 
the sake of rational ones became more explicit in Origen's 
reply to the contemporary Epicurean philosopher Celsus' 
rejection of such teleology (third century) (17). Origen, 
however, considered the diversity in the world the result of a 
decline from the unity and harmony of the original creation, 
and attributed it to a primeval fall, prior to the creation of 
humanity (18), which would be rectified at the eventual 
restoration at the end of time. But this speculative view 
diverged so far from belief in the goodness of the nonhuman 
creation around us that it was rejected by most of Origen's 
successors, including Augustine, who cited in reply the 
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significance of Genesis 1:31 ("And God saw everything that 
he had made, and behold, it was very good") (19). 
Much more influential within Orthodox churches (and beyond) 
were the fourth century Cappadocians Basil the Great, his 
brother Gregory of Nyssa, their sister Macrina and their friend 
Gregory of Nazianzus. These writers respected classical Greek 
culture, and in particular Plato's Timaeus, but supplied 
Christian correctives to pagan accounts of creation, of ethics 
and of the soul. While revering the Christian scholarship of 
Origen, they ascribed the diversity of nature to God's creation 
and not to the wickedness of prehuman creatures. Thus Macrina 
and Gregory of Nyssa held that it was impossible for "all 
created nature ... to hold together" "without the care and 
providence of God" (20), and that all things "are moving 
towards the goal" of "the transcendent good of the universe" 
(21). 
Developing a form of writing launched in Philo's meditation On 
the Creation, Basil composed a Hexaemeron or commentary in 
popular style on Genesis 1, a practice in which he was shortly 
to be imitated by Ambrose, an influential figure in the Latin 
West. The world is presented as a work of art, which is both 
beautiful and useful as a training-ground for human souls. 
However, at the original creation it was incomplete, and its 
completion is to be achieved in part by humanity: "for the 
proper and natural adornment of the earth is its completion: 
corn waving in the valleys - meadows green with grass and rich 
with many-coloured flowers - fertile glades and hilltops shaded 
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by forests" (22). 
According to Basil, the grasses serve both animals and man 
(23). That Basil's is not an entirely anthropocentric cosmology 
may also be learned from a prayer of his: "And for these also, 
o Lord, the humble beasts, who bear with us the heat and burden 
of the day, we beg thee to extend thy great kindness of heart, 
for thou hast promised to save both man and beast, and great is 
thy loving-kindness, o Master" (24). 
Overall, the Greek fathers certainly saw nature as a symbolic 
source of edification, expressed in many an allegory (25), and 
regarded it too as offering a retreat from contemporary 
civilisation, with all its compromises. They were also careful 
to avoid the pantheism often implicit in pagan religion, to 
avoid idolatry at all costs, and to distinguish sharply between 
the creature and the Creator (26), much as they relished 
arguing from the creation back to its source. But they also saw 
nature as created both for God's glory and as an invitation and 
challenge to human creativity and adornment; the impact of sin 
had not altogether deprived it of its perfectibility or 
humanity of the potential to complete God's work. All these 
themes have remained important in Orthodox theology down the 
centuries, and have also strongly influenced Western churches 
within the ecumenical movement throughout the twentieth 
century. 
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In the West, Ambrose, following Basil, popularised the 
conception of humanity as partner of God in improving the 
earth (27). Augustine, a much more original thinker, developed 
another theme of Eastern origins, that of nature as a book. 
Earlier, Athanasius had praised the book of creation which 
proclaims the divine master and creator of its harmony and 
order, and John Chrysostom had imparted how the book of nature 
was available to peoples who do not understand the language of 
the Bible (28). Augustine now stressed how nature's book was 
open even to the most unlettered: "heaven and earth cry out to 
you: God made me!" (29). In later centuries the nature-as-book 
analogy found new uses as a defence of the empirical methods 
of natural science. 
Augustine produced a new synthesis of themes from the Bible 
and from Aristotle and, more particularly, Plato, elaborating 
a Christian version of belief in the Great Chain of Being. 
All the rungs on the scale of possible being are occupied, 
sentient beings having greater value than nonsentient, 
intelligent beings greater value still, and immortal ones 
like angels having greater value than mortal humans. The 
human body, however, has a beauty and dignity expressive of 
the glory and beauty of its creator (30). More generally, the 
world's phenomena glorify their divine artificer "not with 
respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to 
their own nature". Aristotle's conception of the end of a 
species being internal to itself (31) is blended here with 
the Pauline theme of the diverse glories of creatures, in a 
statement which excludes anthropocentrism, and is barely 
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reconcilable with Augustine's despotic stance on relations 
with animals, noted earlier. 
The works of humanity are also wonderful, but nothing in 
creation is to be compared to the creator. However, the entire 
created world is now infected with the effects of human sin. 
While Origen's view of a pre-human fall is rejected, all evil 
is to be ascribed to humanity, which, since Adam's fall, is 
hopelessly depraved unless saved by God's grace in Christ 
(32). Augustine thus produces a remarkable combination of 
life-affirming and of ascetic themes. As Glacken acknowledges, 
summaries could be devised presenting his valuation of nature 
as a low one (33), as Matthew Fox has done in Original 
Blessing (34); but in Glacken's own summary, echoed by H. Paul 
Santmire, for Augustine "The earth, life on earth, the 
beauties of nature, are also creations of God. Man, full of 
sin and prone to sinning, is nevertheless a glorious product 
of God's greatness" (35). While his advocacy of an extreme 
doctrine of original sin has been influential and arguably 
pernicious, Fox is demonstrably mistaken to represent him as a 
despiser and distruster of creation; as Bauckham shows, his 
affirmative doctrine of nature and its glories actually 
supports an ecologically sensitive approach (36). 
While the character of Augustine's influence remainss open to 
debate, for many the teaching of Christianity about nature 
was mediated instead either by monasteries, for which sites 
of beauty were often sought, or by the church's liturgy. 
Monasteries now (in the sixth century) began to be founded in 
PAGE 15 
the West, in accordance with the Rule of Benedict. Work, as in 
gardens and fields, was regarded as prayer, and was conducted 
partly for its own sake and partly to enhance the land, its 
fertility and thus its self-sufficiency (37), especially among 
the later Cistercian foundations, as described by Bernard of 
Clairvaux (twelfth century) (38). Hildegard of Bingen, the 
eleventh-century founder of an abbey, also used to celebrate 
the beauty and glories of the natural world (39). 
Meanwhile the medieval Roman liturgy incorporated prayers for 
sick animals and stables, as well as curses on vermin and 
pests (40); like the well-known and much-loved story of 
Christ's nativity in a stable, such words cannot have 
presented a dispassionate or instrumentalist attitude to 
nature. The same is true of the 'Benedicite', which has been 
used liturgically from earliest times to the present day. 
Passmore claims that "Augustinian Christianity neither laid 
the task [of completing God's creation] on man's shoulders nor 
promised God's help if he should undertake it" (41), but 
Augustine held that humanity participates in God's work 
through the arts and the sciences, including agriculture (42), 
and Western monasteries, from Benedict to Bernard, bore this 
out in practice. The belief that human wickedness was 
sufficient to infect nature with evil, granted the technology 
of the time, certainly smacks of arrogance (43); but the human 
effort invested over the next few centuries in the improvement 
of nature has recently generated White's opposing charge of a 
domineering attitude, specially prevalent in Western attitudes 
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(44), and embodied in medieval deep ploughing, irrigation and 
forest clearances. However, White is now widely recognised as 
guilty of overgeneralisation and exaggeration; the domineering 
attitude prevalent in nineteenth and twentieth century 
technology does not require Western patristic attitudes for 
its explanation. Indeed, while the Benedictines accepted the 
inherited belief in the dominion of humanity over nature, Rene 
Dubos has aptly characterised their attitude of caring for and 
enhancing the land in their charge as one of stewardship, and 
therewith a paradigm of environmental responsibility (45). 
Thomas Aquinas persistently defended the goodness of nature, 
in criticism of Albigensians and others who held that nature, 
including the human body, was evil. Each part of the universe, 
he argued, exists for its own particular end, and all are 
needed to comprise the hierarchy of being; pace Origen, nature 
is not a reflection of sin, and, on the contrary, everywhere 
reflects God's glory (46). 
However, the fall has reduced the obedience of other creatures 
to man; since the fall, domestication has been necessary to 
master the animals. This is in keeping with God's plan, 
whereby rational creatures rule over others; but this mastery 
depends on God, a fact which brings to mind the need for 
humility (47). Here Aquinas accepts Origen's view about the 
subordination of irrational creatures to rational ones, 
despite his beliefs about the distinct value of all creatures. 
Indeed he sometimes comes close to the view that it is 
indifferent how humans behave to animals, but then adds that 
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insofar as animals are sentient, pity at their sufferings is 
natural, and that this accounts for Proverbs 12:10, the text 
about consideration for domestic animals. Though his text at 
once reverts to human needs, this point is prefixed with 
"besides", indicating that the previous point had some 
independent weight (48). Yet Thomas' eventually influential 
position still represents a narrowing of Christian teaching, 
and has sometimes been taken to deny any moral standing to 
nonhuman creatures. 
A rival view was held by Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) and 
some of his followers. Francis, like Aquinas, accepted the 
goodness of creation in all its diversity, but he also praised 
God for all his creatures, not only as types but also as 
individuals, regarded them as brothers, and urged them to 
praise God too, as in Psalm 148. Francis actually preached to 
birds, fishes and flowers (49). While his stress on the 
individuality of creatures exempts him from the charge of 
pantheism, and also from Lynn White's label (of 
'panpsychism'), his belief in God's immanence in each and 
every creature makes him, as J. Donald Hughes suggests, a 
panentheist (50). Thus, without rejecting the human dominion 
over nature, he intepreted it in a companionable, non-despotic 
manner. 
Within the medieval period (when the days of printing and mass 
literacy lay in the future), ordinary believers were probably 
influenced less by the theologians than by the liturgy (see 
above) and by the lives of the saints. For St. Francis stood 
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at the end of a thousand-year-long succession of saints, many 
of them famed for their fellowship with and compassion for 
animals, both wild and domestic, from the days of St. Antony 
the Great (third century), founder of an ancient monastery in 
Sinai (51). Both in East and West, stories circulated widely 
of saints who resorted to wilderness for tranquillity and 
meditation, and in many cases (such as the seventh-century 
Cuthbert in Northumbria) sought to live in the spirit of 
Jesus' companionship with the beasts. 
ATTITUDES OF THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD 
The humanist writers of the Renaissance emphasised the 
supremacy of humanity over nature to the virtual exclusion of 
any ties with nonhuman creatures. Among them, the sense of 
creatureliness has disappeared, and an unlimited doctrine of 
human despotism has replaced traditional interpretations of 
belief in the dominion of humanity. Indeed Bauckham comments 
that "The attitudes which have led to the contemporary 
ecological crisis can be traced back to this source, but no 
further" (52). My comment is that where the humanists 
abandoned belief in creatureliness and in creation, they also 
stepped outside Christianity, sometimes adopting a combination 
of Hermeticism and pantheism instead. 
The Protestant Reformation reemphasised dependence on the 
lordship and grace of God, Martin Luther stressing God's 
immanence in every grain of creation (53). It also brought 
explicit discussion of stewardship on the part of Jean Calvin, 
who wrote: "Let every one regard himself as the steward of God 
in all things which he possesses" (54), upholding a vocational 
view of all human activity. Like Aquinas and Luther (55), 
Calvin adhered to an anthropocentric stance; but he combined 
this with the belief that the beasts, though created for 
humanity, were to be treated with respect and not misused. 
Thus God "will not have us abuse the beasts beyond measure, 
but to nourish them and to have care of them." "If a man spare 
neither his horse nor his ox nor his ass, therein he betrayeth 
the wickedness of his nature. And if he say, "Tush, I care 
not, for it is but a brute beast," I answer again, "Yea, but 
it is a creature of God" (56). Calvin's view was echoed in 
England in the next century by George Hughes; man's rule was 
"subordinate and stewardly, not absolutely to do what he list 
with God's creatures" (57). Here stewards are subordinates 
with creaturely duties concerning fellow-creatures, owed not 
to them but to God: an anthropocentric version of stewardship, 
comparable to Aquinas' view. Other Protestants of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, adopted more 
biocentric views (58). 
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Assuming an anthropocentric position, Francis Bacon understood 
human dominion as the right and power to use nature for human 
benefit (59). The fall had a double impact, engendering both 
sin and ignorance about nature, but both falls can in part be 
repaired, the former by faith, and the latter by intellectual 
labour. This latter restoration of the lost human dominion 
over nature was Bacon's central purpose (60). Unlike the 
Italian humanists, he recognises that this will be a gradual, 
painstaking task (61), requiring the humility to observe and 
thus conform to and obey nature, to discern "the footsteps of 
the creator imprinted on his creatures", and thus to discover 
(not dictate or remould) God's laws (62). For Bacon was 
strongly opposed to "domineering over nature" (63), which he 
believed to be the main failing of previous (Greek and 
medieval) natural philosophy, and to be responsible for 
humanity's second fall. 
While Bacon's motive was love of humanity, his project was the 
control of nature for human benefit, with no sense of nature's 
independent value, or even of its aesthetic or symbolic value. 
But it would be wrong to conclude that science became 
instrumentalist from this point. This view disregards the 
belief of most of its sevententh-century participants that the 
study of science was an expression of the duty to glorify God. 
Meanwhile Bacon and his successors who founded the Royal 
Society presented theistic grounds for rejecting veneration of 
nature and the belief that scientific study and the 
application of that study were intrinsically impious; for 
(unlike pagan nature-worship) belief in creation implies that 
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nature is neither sacred or beyond investigation, while the 
biblical ethic suggests that effort is called for to relieve 
illness and hunger, and this presupposes that their causes can 
be discovered by humanity. Certainly Bacon's language about 
putting nature to the test and extorting her secrets, is 
exploitative (64), and lent support to the vogue for 
vivisection of the later decades of the century; but this 
approach was soon to be met with correctives within as well as 
outside the scientific community. 
Bacon's contemporary Rene Descartes proposed a different 
method for investigating nature, but on a markedly similar 
basis. Within his rationalist approach, non-human animals were 
actually regarded as machines, although the widespread view 
that he held that they lacked feelings is open to doubt (65). 
(The reality of animal suffering was vindicated against 
followers of his by contemporary followers of Aquinas.(66)) 
Despite his aim that we should "render ourselves the masters 
and possessors of nature" (67), like Gassendi and Galileo, he 
rejected the view that everything was made for humanity (68). 
The language of stewardship was explicitly related to nature, 
the animals and the Earth for the first time by Sir Matthew 
Hale, sometime Chief Justice of England, in 1677 in The 
Primitive Origination of Mankind. According to Hale, the 
purpose of "Man's Creation was that he should be the Viceroy" 
of God, "his Steward, Villicus, Bayliff, or Farmer of this 
goodly Farm of the lower World", man being "his Usufructuary 
of this inferior World to husband and order it, and enjoy the 
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Fruits thereof with sobriety, moderation and thankfulness." 
"Man was invested with power, authority, right, dominion, 
trust and care", to limit the fiercer animals, protect the 
tame and useful ones, preserve vegetable species, to improve 
the species, to curtail unprofitable vegetation, and "to 
preserve the face of the Earth in beauty, usefulness, and 
fruitfulness" (69). Besides supplying here the classical 
expression of Christian teaching on stewardship of the Earth, 
Hale was seeking to ground theology not in revelation but in 
nature and the purposes which seem to underlie it (70). 
As Thomas points out, Hale's position was not exceptional; 
Thomas Tryon, for example, stipulates that humanity's rule is 
not to be tyrannical, but to conduce to the glory of God, the 
benefit (but not the wantonness) of humanity, and also to the 
wellbeing of the beasts in accordance with their created 
natures (71). With Tryon, a nonanthropocentric tendency is 
even clearer than in Hale. 
Attitudes to animals were importantly affected in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the humanitarian 
movement, which simultaneously changed public opinion and 
practice in Britain and America in matters of slavery, 
punishment and working conditions. Thomas has shown the 
prevalence of blood-sports in sixteenth-century England (72). 
But concern about animal suffering was also expressed at least 
from the time of the Puritan, Philip Stubbes (1583) onwards 
(73). Subsequent advocates of compassion included Christians 
such as Locke, William Wollaston, John Balguy and Francis 
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Hutcheson, 
Evangelicals,
, 
 and in 
as 
general Quakers, 
well as sceptics
 such 
Methodists and 
such asMontaigne
 , 
Shaftesbury, Voltaire, Hume and Bentham (74). During the 
nineteenth century the movement achieved a number of political 
reforms. With the introduction in the twentieth century of the 
practice of factory-farming and with increasing 
experimentation on animals, humanitarianism is still far from 
victorious, but both Christian and secular ethics have 
longsince accepted at the normative level the wrongness of 
treating nonhuman animals as simply means to human ends. 
Negative attitudes to wilderness were transmitted from England 
by early colonists to America, 'America' being John Locke's 
term for 'wilderness' (75). But by the early nineteenth 
century they began to be superseded by contrary valuations, 
based on interpretations of wild nature as creation, such as 
Ralph Waldo Emerson's Nature (1836) and Henry David Thoreau's 
Walden (1854) (76), valuations more in line with those of the 
desert fathers, but appreciative also of the system of 
"Oeconomy of Nature" (Linnaeus' phrase), and the distinctive 
places of creatures within the meshes of its interlocking net. 
Subsequently, for the environmentalist John Muir "the basis of 
respect for nature was to recognise it as part of the created 
community to which humans also belonged" (77). Covertly a 
believer in the intrinsic value and rights of all creatures, 
Muir's entry into the politics of wilderness preservation led 
him (like many subsequent environmental campaigners) to adopt 
an anthropocentric public stance, laced with charges of 
sacrilege against destroyers of the temple of nature (78). 
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Charles Darwin's discovery of evolution by natural selection, 
presented in The Origin of Species in 1859, conveyed the 
continuity between humanity and other species. In The Descent 
of Man (1871), Darwin drew the implication that nature cannot 
be regarded as a hierarchy, with humanity as a special 
creation at its apex, and other species existing for 
humanity's sake (79). Among Darwin's contemporaries, 
Christians such as Charles Kingsley and Asa Gray welcomed 
Darwin's discoveries, and, as Owen Chadwick has pointed out, 
the main Protestant denominations in Britain and USA had 
accepted Darwinism by 1900 (80). Some twentieth-century self-
styled "creationists" have attempted to retract this 
acceptance, but cannot claim that belief in creation requires 
rejection of Darwinism. 
In the twentieth century, Catholic Thomist theologians such 
as Maritain and Journet have proved willing to accept duties 
owed directly to animals (81); while Anglican bishops have 
rediscovered the spirituality of eastern Orthodoxy and have 
been prominent in applying stewardship to environmental 
concern, some asserting that the sacraments of Christianity, 
with their focus on elements like bread and wine, strengthen 
the Christian awareness of value in the material creation 
(82). Certainly the charge of other-wordliness and of 
disparagement of life on earth has no remaining credibility, 
in view of Catholic advocacy of social justice and of the 
social teaching of the Life and Work Division of the 
Protestant and Orthodox World Council of Churches. Some 
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theologians even hail Darwinism for subverting the traditional 
static view of nature and introducing a more historical view, 
like that of the Bible (83). 
OVERVIEW 
Besides the charges of other-wordliness and of disparagement 
of life on earth, the more widespread charges that 
Christianity teaches a despotic and anthropocentric attitude 
to nature turn out to be similarly misplaced, despite their 
relevance to some tracts of medieval and early modern history. 
Such charges are usually based on unreflective interpretations 
of the Judaeo-Christian belief in human dominion over nature, 
which sounds as if it might support unqualified domination. 
But in view of the conditional and qualified understanding of 
all human authority in the Old Testament, and of explicit 
biblical teaching endorsing the independent value of natural 
creatures and recognising the place of nohuman nature in the 
scheme of salvation, such interpretations prove to have been 
no better than rationalisations of exploitative practices. 
Dominion over nature is rather to be construed as responsible 
stewardship, while, for Christians who are true to their 
scriptures, stewardship is best construed not 
anthropocentrically (as with Calvin) but as involving humble 
recognition of the intrinsic value of fellow-creatures. 
Belief in stewardship is sometimes held to be actually 
inconsistent with belief in the independent value of natural 
creatures, or with God's immanent presence in creation, as it 
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supposedly involves a managerial and instrumentalist attitude 
to the material order. But these claims of inconsistency are 
an illusion; for stewardship (as with Hale) need not involve 
an instrumentalist attitude, and need not be solely managerial 
(as even Calvin shows in teaching ethical limits to the 
treatment of animals). Further, belief in divine immanence in 
nature cannot preclude its use by humanity, or this belief 
would also have precluded using nature for food and shelter 
from earliest times. 
Yet criticism of dualism continues, even after charges of 
otherwordliness and of arrogance and lack of humility have 
been discarded. Thus Matthew Fox criticises an ethic of care 
for the garden of creation as dualistic, since it 
distinguishes between God and the garden, instead of 
recognising that God is the garden (84). But if God is the 
garden, then the garden (and the rest of the material 
universe too) is not created, there is no Creator, there are 
no fellow-creatures to care for, and the world is not God's 
world. Short of some other basis, belief in the goodness of 
creation collapses too. Belief in the distinctness of God and 
creation is essential to theistic ethics, whether Christian, 
Jewish, or Islamic. If this is dualism, then dualism (of this 
kind) is essential to theistic ethics, and to positions such 
as the panentheism of St Francis too. But this kind of dualism 
in no way implies either a dualism of body and spirit or the 
dualism of otherworldliness. 
However, it is sometimes claimed that belief in stewardship 
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itself implies dualism in the form of an unacceptable 
relation between humanity and other species. For it implies 
that humanity is empowered to remould much of the natural 
world, despite the ethical constraints which attach to this 
power. This, it is suggested, too greatly privileges 
humanity; instead, humans should see themselves as simply 
one species among others, and humanity as a plain citizen 
in ecological society. 
Now if this just means that equal interests should be given 
equal consideration, whichever creature has these interests, 
it can be accepted. But it also seems to imply that there is 
nothing distinctive about human agency and human moral 
responsibility; for it seems to imply that no higher priority 
should be accorded to developing, preserving and respecting 
capacities for freedom of choice than to the interests of 
creatures which lack these capacities. This, however, cannot 
be reconciled with a recognition of distinctive human moral 
responsibilities, which cannot be significantly exercised 
unless the corresponding capacities are fostered and 
respected. Once human moral responsibility is recognised, 
humanity cannot be seen as simply one species among others; 
and the distinctive role of humanity as empowered to shape 
considerable tracts of the natural world has to be recognised 
as well. This makes it all the more important to stress the 
ethical constraints on this power, as belief in stewardship 
does, rather than to pretend that this power does not or 
should not exist, as egalitarians in matters of species 
relations seem to do. Thus the distinctive role which belief 
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in stewardship assumes for humanity is not fundamentally 
objectionable, or therefore incompatible with the aims of 
clear-thinking environmentalists. 
Yet there is a danger that the exercise of human power will 
too greatly erode both wilderness and other species, and that 
before all the mountains are mined, all the oceans are fished 
and all the forests are felled, we should plan to halt human 
expansion, and devise sustainable means of survival which 
preserve most remaining creatures and habitats. The Christian 
vision of companionship with the wild creatures supports such 
limits, as without such limits there will be no wild creatures 
to be companionable with, as opposed to domestic animals and 
species parasitic on human activity. The claim that such 
limits should be endorsed is compatible with belief in 
stewardship without being mandated by that belief; but this 
claim is in any case supported by the biblical belief in the 
independent value of wild creatures, and so a range of 
Christian teachings can be appealed to in its support. 
Accordingly, despite ugly episodes and depressing periods 
in its history, Christianity turns out to encapsulate 
beliefs supportive of environmentally sensitive attitudes 
and policies, and can be appealed to as such. While this 
does not make Christian doctrines true, it means that no 
one need choose between Christianity and environmentalism, 
and that theistic belief in creation (whether Judaic, 
Islamic or Christian) can inspire sustainable relations 
between humanity and the rest of the natural world. 
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